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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7923  
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE  
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 7937  
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1496  
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 6773  
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 3649  
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0831  
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1878  
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 6482  
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC  
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC  
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 8541  
RHMCUUU/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC  
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC  
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC  
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC  
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC  
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RHMCUUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL  
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI  
RUEKJCS/Joint STAFF WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 001858

SENSITIVE  
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DEPT FOR SCA/INS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/03/2019  
TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP ENRG IN  
SUBJECT: INDIA POSITIVE ON STRATEGIC SECURITY DIALOGUE, DUG  
IN ON FUEL BANKS, CONSTRUCTIVE ON IRAN

REF: A. STATE 90231  
    1B. STATE 91199  
    1C. STATE 91633

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Uzra Zeya. Reasons: 1.4 (B, D).

11. (C) SUMMARY: Indian MEA Acting Joint Secretary for Disarmament and International Security Gill agreed in principle to holding the senior-level Strategic Security Dialogue in Washington in early October. He gave an informal, positive response to the proposed agenda and will provide further feedback on agenda items after consultation within the MEA. Regarding India's stance on Nuclear Fuel Banks, he signaled India's commitment to its position at the June IAEA meeting. India sees the proposal as a positive development and would like to participate as a supplier and beneficiary, but strongly believes the Banks should not be based on discriminatory or exclusionary principles. Gill indicated that the NAM member states were likely to push for a boilerplate statement regarding the IAEA DG reports on Syria and Iran. India was working to moderate Iran's influence in NAM and to steer NAM statements toward a middle ground. He relayed that India would make an additional statement of its own. END SUMMARY.

Strategic Security Talks: Dates

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12. (C) In a September 1 meeting, poloff discussed the proposed dates, participants, and agenda for the Strategic Security Talks (Ref A) with acting Joint Secretary for Disarmament and International Security (MEA/DISA) Amandeep Singh Gill. He thought a meeting in Washington the week of October 5 would be feasible, although he noted that India was unlikely to be able to conduct some of the suggested expert level dialogues if the Security Dialogue plenary was in Washington.

Participants

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¶13. (C) Gill suggested that MEA Special Secretary Vivek Katju would lead for the Indian side, but a subsequent conversation with Joint Secretary (Americas) Gaitri Kumar suggested that Foreign Secretary Rao intended to lead discussions.

(Comment: We will try to nail down both participation and dates next week.) Gill inquired about what interagency representation we envisioned so that the Indian delegation could match. He shared that the Indian delegation in June 2007 included officials from MEA/Americas, MEA/DISA, DRDO, DAE, and the PMO.

Agenda

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¶14. (C) He praised the agenda as "very comprehensive," but did not offer further thoughts on any specific items. He promised an Indian response after he had consulted with colleagues.

Nuclear Fuel Banks

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¶15. (C) We delivered Ref B demarche to Gill in a separate September 3 meeting. Gill told us that India sees the fuel banks a positive development in nonproliferation, and wants to be part of it. India could be a beneficiary as well as a

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contributor to the fuel banks. New Delhi does not want the fuel banks to be based on principles that India believes discriminate against it or exclude it. These substantive points, said Gill, are not new and will not vary. He indicated that India is already discussing with the Russians how to move ahead on these proposals without impinging on India's interests. India did not feel as though it was speaking only for itself at the June IAEA Board of Governors meeting. Although other states moved forward on fuel assurances there, Gill noted that we should not conclude that other NAM countries do not share India's concerns.

Latest IAEA Reports on Iran and Syria

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¶16. (C) We delivered Ref C demarche to the Joint Secretary in the same September 3 meeting. Gill indicated that the NAM countries will make their usual boilerplate statement about the IAEA DG reports on Syria and Iran, including supporting the inalienable right of all states to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. India is working to moderate Iran's influence in the NAM and to steer NAM statements toward a middle ground that more closely reflects the summit and ministerial level statements. In the larger political context, he remarked, the NAM countries are interested in encouraging dialogue and peaceful resolutions and the DG reports affect NAM statements strongly. He maintained that Iran gets a consistent message from the NAM that it needs to cooperate more fully. He indicated that India will issue a separate statement in addition to the NAM statement.

ROEMER